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THE FINALITY QUESTION: APPELLATE
RIGHTS AND REVIEW OF ARBITRAL
AWARDS IN THE AMERICAS
Andrew P. Tuck*
HE use of arbitration to resolve commercial disputes has grown
substantially over the past decade throughout the Americas. Yet,
parties to inter-American commercial transactions may give little
thought to drafting the arbitration clause or to locating the optimal place,
or "seat," of the arbitration.' When parties do consider the seat, they
often limit consideration to its status as a signatory to the New York Con-
vention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
(the New York Convention),2 the preeminent treaty governing the en-
forcement of arbitral awards. Special attention should be paid, however,
to the rights of appeal and review in the jurisdiction ultimately selected.
Such rights can seriously frustrate the advantages of international arbitra-
tion-predictability and neutrality as a forum, the potential for special-
ized legal expertise, the costs of the arbitral process, the finality of the
arbitral award, and the speed by which the award can be enforced
abroad-over the vicissitudes and uncertainties of international business
litigation. 3 Most importantly, expanded review of an arbitral award in
the chosen jurisdiction can lead to arbitrary decision making during the
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1. Daniel M. Kolkey, ATTACKING ARBITRAL AWARDS: RIGHTS OF APPEAL AND RE-
VIEW IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS, 22 Int'l Law 693 (1988).
2. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention].
The New York Convention commits the courts in contracting states to recognize
and enforce arbitration awards. The Convention may apply to both commercial
and non-commercial awards. Indeed, under the Convention, there are two reser-
vations available to contracting states: the reciprocity reservation (only those
awards made in territories of contracting states will be enforced under the Conven-
tion) and the commercial reservation (limiting the Convention's application to
commercial matters). Over half of all signatories to the Convention opted for reci-
procity and one third of the signatories have elected the commercial reservation.
3. See Ralph H. Folsom, Michael W. Gordon, & John A. Spagnole, Jr., International
Business Transactions, Trade And Economic Relations 732 (1st ed. 2005).
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enforcement process while the same award would more likely be en-
forced in another jurisdiction with a narrower scope of review even if
rendered by the same arbitrators. 4
Indeed, article V of the New York Convention sets forth exclusive ex-
ceptions to recognition of an arbitral award: invalidity of the arbitral
agreement; violation of due process; procedural irregularities; non-arbi-
trability of the dispute; violation of public policy; failure of the award to
become binding; or suspension or setting aside of an award in the country
where the award was made.5 Pursuant to the last defense, however, a
successful appeal of an award in the issuing state can prevent its enforce-
ment abroad. Specifically, article V, section 1(e) of the New York Con-
vention allows a court to refuse to recognize and enforce an award when
"[t]he award ... has been set aside or suspended by a competent author-
ity of the country in which ... that award was made."'6 Therefore, if "the
scope of judicial review in a rendering state extends beyond" the New
York Convention's other defenses, then "the losing party's opportunity to
avoid enforcement is automatically enhanced."'7
The initiation of an appellate process in the rendering state also jeopar-
dizes speedy enforcement of the award elsewhere. Article VI of the New
York Convention provides that recognition and enforcement of an arbi-
tral award may be delayed if an application for setting aside or sus-
pending the award has been made to the competent authority in the
country where the award was rendered. 8
To assist inter-American practitioners in selecting a site that will pro-
mote finality once an award is rendered, this article presents a compara-
tive analysis of appellate rights in three jurisdictions utilized for
conducting inter-American arbitrations: 1) the United States, including a
brief description of Florida law due to Miami's emergence as a seat for
international commercial arbitration in the Americas; 2) Mexico, widely
viewed as the country with the most developed arbitral laws in Latin
America; and 3) Chile, which seeks to become a leading regional center
for international arbitration.
I. UNITED STATES
A. U.S. INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION LAW
Major Treaties: The United States is a party to the New York Conven-
tion (entered into force for the United States on December 29, 1970) 9,
and the Panama Convention (entered into force for the United States on
4. Kolkey, supra note 1, at v693.
5. New York Convention, supra note 2, art. 6.
6. Id. art. 5.
7. Kolkey, supra note 1, at 694.
8. New York Convention, supra note 2, art. 6.
9. New York Convention, supra note 2. The United States opted for reciprocity and
limited the Convention's application to commercial arbitrations.
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October 27, 1990).l ° The United States also is a party to the Interna-
tional Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Conven-
tion, which established the ICSID. 11 The ICSID is designed to serve as a
forum for conciliation and for arbitration of disputes between private in-
vestors and host governments. In addition, chapter 11 of the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFrA) 12 provides for arbitration to
resolve disputes between investors and state parties, as do several other
free trade agreements entered into by the United States, such as the Chile
and Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreements. 13
Finally, the United States is party to over forty bilateral investment trea-
ties, which also provide for arbitration to resolve investor-state
disputes.' 4
National Legislation: In 1925, the United States adopted the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA), which governs arbitration in the United States.1 5
10. Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Jan. 30,
1975, O.A.S.T.S. No. 42, 14 I.L.M. 336 (1975) [hereinafter Panama Convention].
The Panama Convention is similar to the New York Convention in many respects.
Among other things, it provides for the general enforceability of arbitration agree-
ments and arbitral awards, subject to specified exceptions similar to those in the
New York Convention. The United States ratified the Convention subject to the
reciprocity reservation. Unlike the New York Convention, however, by its terms
the Panama Convention is limited to "commercial transaction[s]," so that no com-
mercial reservation was necessary.
11. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nation-
als of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter
ICSID Convention]. ICSID's jurisdiction extends only "to any legal dispute arising
directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State or . . .any subdivi-
sion . . . and a national of another Contracting State, which the parties to the
dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre." Id. art. 25. "Where the parties
have given their consent, no party may withdraw its consent unilaterally." Id.
Thus, the ICSID Convention is an attempt to institutionalize dispute resolution
between States and non-State investors.
12. See North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Ch. 11, Dec. 17,
1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA Chapter 11]; see also the North
American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3473
(1994).
13. Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, June 6, 2003, available at http;//www.ustr.gov/
TradeAgreements/Bilateral/ChileFTAIFinalTexts/SectionIndex.html [herein-
after Chile FTA]; see also Dominican Republic-Central America-United States
Free Trade Agreement, Aug. 5, 2004, available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade-
Agreements/Regional/CAFTFA/CAFTA-DRFinalTexts/SectionIndex.html.
14. See U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty Program, http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/rls/fs/
2008/22422.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2008). BITs became common during the 1980s
and 1990s as a means of encouraging capital investment in developing markets.
Many BITs contain provisions dealing with the enforceability of international arbi-
tration agreements. In addition, some BITs (including the U.S. Model BIT) obli-
gate a host state, at the request of the investor, to submit investment disputes to
binding third-party arbitration.
15. Federal Arbitration Act, §§ 1-307 (2007). Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA) contains the basic provisions of the Act, which make arbitration agree-
ments and awards enforceable. Chapter 2 of the FAA implements the New York
Convention, while Chapter 3 implements the Panama Convention. The FAA sub-
jects any "contract evidencing commerce" to arbitration in the United States to a
single standard for judicial review, regardless of whether the dispute is domestic or
international, notwithstanding state attempts to create a more nuanced framework
for arbitration. Indeed, the FAA is applicable in both state and federal courts.
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The FAA makes both pre-dispute and post-dispute arbitration agree-
ments "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."' 6 Addition-
ally, under the savings clause to section 2, parties can challenge the en-
forceability of arbitration agreements under "ordinary state-law
principles that govern the formation of contracts" (e.g., lack of assent,
absence of consideration, and duress). 17
Procedurally, a party seeking to vacate or modify an arbitration award
under the FAA must petition to do so within three months of the date the
award is filed or delivered. 18 Failure to file within the appropriate time
limit forecloses any judicial review. Finally, a party seeking to confirm an
arbitration award has up to one year after the date of the award to file a
petition to confirm.19
The FAA specifies the statutory grounds for vacating an arbitration
award:
a. [T]he award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
b. [T]here was evident partiality or corruption by the arbitrators...;
c. [T]he arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone
the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evi-
dence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other mis-
behavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced;
d. [T]he arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly exe-
cuted them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject
matter submitted was not made.20
Admittedly, as compared to the New York Convention, the FAA pro-
vides several additional grounds upon which an award can be attacked.
None of them, however, create significant opportunities for a successful
challenge. Issues arising under the FAA as it applies to international ar-
bitration are described in the next section.
Florida Legislation: The Florida International Arbitration Act (FIAA)
was enacted in 1988 when very few of the Latin American and Caribbean
countries with nationals doing business in Florida were signatories to ei-
ther the New York or Panama Conventions.21
16. Id. § 2.
17. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995).
18. Federal Arbitration Act, supra note 15, § 12.
19. Id. § 9. The winning party should wait to file a petition for confirmation until the
time period to vacate the award expires, in order to preclude the opposing party
from filing a counterclaim for vacatur.
20. Id. §§ 9-10.
21. Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 684.01-35 (West 2008). The FIAA applies only in certain limited
circumstances: when the dispute is between two or more persons at least one of
whom is not a resident of the United States; or when all the parties are U.S. re-
sidents and the dispute involves either: 1. Property located outside the United
States; 2. The contract envisaging performance or enforcement in whole or in part
outside the United States; 3. An investment outside the United States or the own-
ership, management, or operation of a business entity through which such an in-
vestment is affected, or any agreement pertaining to such an entity; or 4. Some
relation to a foreign country.
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The FIAA has three parts: Part I provides definitions and scope; Part II
supplies rules for the conduct of international arbitration, incorporating
some of the UNCITRAL Rules;22 and Part III relates to judicial proceed-
ings in support of arbitration. The FIAA is not limited to commercial
matters and can be applied to any dispute "bearing some other relation to
one or more foreign countries. '23 Most grounds for vacating an arbitral
award under the FIAA are consistent with the FAA.24 Any grounds for
vacating an award under the FIAA, however, that are set forth in a more
expansive manner than provided for under the FAA 25 are preempted.
B. CURRENT ISSUES IN U.S. INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION LAW
1. Against Public Policy
Most public policy challenges are rejected because courts find that the
alleged public policies either do not exist or are not compelling enough to
justify abrogating the FAA's policy favoring finality of arbitration
awards. 26
2. Claims Capable of Settlement by Arbitration
Almost all jurisdictions have enacted laws considered "mandatory;"
that is, public laws that private parties cannot avoid by contract. The dis-
tinction between mandatory and non-mandatory law is crucial to the
rights of appeal and review in a particular jurisdiction. Indeed, many
lower U.S. federal courts have held that "mandatory laws" could not be
the subject of arbitration because of the public interest indicated by the
legislative intent underlying the enactment of mandatory law and the
public policy favoring judicial enforcement of such law.
22. United Nations Commission on International Law Arbitration Rules, G.A. Res.
31/98, U.N. Doc. A/Res/31/98 (Dec. 15, 1976). In 1976, the United Nations Com-
mission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) issued the Model International
Commercial Arbitration Rules. The UNCITRAL Rules are intended to be ac-
ceptable in all legal systems and in all parts of the world. Among other things,
UNCITRAL rules provide that an "appointing authority" shall be chosen by the
parties or, if they fail to agree upon that point, shall be chosen by the Secretary-
General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague (comprised of a body
of persons prepared to act as arbitrators if requested). The UNCITRAL rules also
cover notice requirements, representation of the parties, challenges of arbitrators,
evidence, hearings, the place of arbitration, language, statements of claims and
defenses, pleas to the arbitrator's jurisdiction, provisional remedies, experts, de-
fault, rule waivers, the form and effect of the award, applicable law, settlement,
interpretation of the award and costs.
23. George K. Walker, Trends in State Legislation Governing International Arbitra-
tions, 17 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 419, 426 (1992).
24. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 684.25(1)(a), (b), (f), (g) (West 2007)..
25. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 684.25(1)(c)-(e) (West 2007).
26. See, e.g., United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987) (no
demonstration of well defined and dominant public policy against operation of
dangerous machinery while under influence of drugs); PaineWebber, Inc. v.
Agron, 49 F. 3d 347 (8th Cir. 1995) (no well-defined public policy requiring hon-
esty in securities industry in laws or legal precedent).
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In Wilko v. Swan, Wilko, a customer, agreed with Hayden, Stone &
Co., a large securities brokerage firm, to purchase on margin 1,600 shares
of a corporation's common stock.27 Wilko alleged, however, that his
purchase of the stock was induced by the defendant's misrepresentations
concerning the value of the shares, and sued in federal district court for
damages under the Securities Act of 1933.
The defendant moved to stay the trial of the action claiming that Wilko
had agreed to submit all controversies arising out of the purchase to arbi-
tration, and that this agreement, contained in a written margin contract
between the parties, should be given full effect under the FAA. The dis-
trict court held that the agreement to arbitrate deprived Wilko of a court
remedy afforded by the Securities Act and denied the stay. A divided
Court of Appeals reversed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Supreme Court encountered "(t)wo policies, not easily reconcila-
ble," in this case. 28 Indeed, the FAA stressed "the need for avoiding the
delay and expense of litigation"2 9 and directed that arbitration agree-
ments be "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable" in federal courts.30 Con-
versely, the Securities Act of 1933 was "[d]esigned to protect investors"
and to require "issuers, underwriters, and dealers to make full and fair
disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate and foreign com-
merce and to prevent fraud in their sale," by creating "a special right to
recover for misrepresentation. '31 In particular, the Court noted that sec-
tion 14 of the Securities Act provided: "Any condition, stipulation, or
provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance
with any provision of this subchapter or of the rules and regulations of
the Commission shall be void."'3 2 The Court held that an agreement to
arbitrate "is a 'stipulation,"' and that the "right to select the judicial fo-
rum is the kind of 'provision' that cannot be waived under [section] 14 of
the Securities Act."'33 Therefore, Wilko's agreement to arbitrate any dis-
putes arising out of his contract to purchase securities was unenforceable
under the Securities Act of 1933.
More recently, however, the rise of international arbitration in the
United States has limited the range of these traditional public policy ex-
ceptions to the arbitrability of disputes and has cast doubt on their con-
tinuing validity. For example, in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,34 the
Supreme Court distinguished its earlier holding in Wilko. Alberto-Cul-
ver, an American company based in Illinois, manufactured and distrib-
uted toiletries and hair products domestically and abroad. Alberto-
Culver decided to expand its overseas operations and purchased from
27. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
28. Id. at 438.
29. Id. at 431.
30. Federal Arbitration Act, supra note 15, § 2.
31. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 431.
32. Id. at 431 n.6.
33. Id. at 434-35.
34. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
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Fritz Scherk, a German citizen, three interrelated enterprises engaged in
the manufacture of toiletries and rights to trademarks in cosmetic goods.
The sales contract contained several express warranties whereby Scherk
guaranteed the sole and unencumbered ownership of these trademarks.
Additionally, the sales contract contained an arbitration clause providing
that any dispute would be referred to arbitration before the International
Chamber of Commerce in Paris, France, and that Illinois law would gov-
ern the agreement, its interpretation, and its performance.
A year later Alberto-Culver allegedly discovered that the trademark
rights purchased under the contract were subject to substantial encum-
brances. Alberto-Culver offered to rescind the contract, but when Scherk
refused, Alberto-Culver sued Scherk in federal district court contending
that Scherk's fraudulent representations concerning the status of the
trademark rights violated the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
In response, Scherk moved to dismiss the action or, alternatively, to
stay the action pending arbitration in Paris. Alberto-Culver then sought
a preliminary injunction restraining the prosecution of arbitration pro-
ceedings. The district court denied Scherk's motion to dismiss and en-
joined him from proceeding with arbitration. The Court of Appeals
affirmed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Supreme Court declined to extend the public policy exception on
the arbitrability of claims under the Securities Act of 1933 to interna-
tional arbitration of claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.35
The Court ordered arbitration on the grounds that Alberto-Culver's
claim arose from an international contract, thus invoking considerations
and policies significantly different from the domestic context. Notably,
absent the arbitration provision, considerable uncertainty would exist
concerning the law applicable to the resolution of disputes arising out of
the contract. A "contractual provision specifying in advance the forum
for litigating disputes and the law to be applied is," therefore, "an almost
indispensable precondition to achieving the orderliness and predictability
essential to any international business transaction. '36
Finally, in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
the Supreme Court held that a party to an international agreement with a
general executory arbitration clause may not seek the aid of the federal
courts for relief in a claim under the antitrust laws but must submit the
claims to an arbitral tribunal.37 The Mitsubishi case began when Soler, an
automobile dealer in Puerto Rico, sought to avoid an arbitration clause in
its agreement to distribute Mitsubishi cars. The clause provided for arbi-
tration in Japan pursuant to the rules and procedures of the Japan Com-
mercial Arbitration Association. Soler asserted, however, that Mitsubishi
had violated U.S. federal antitrust laws. The district court held that the
international character of the Mitsubishi-Soler undertaking required en-
35. Id.
36. Id. at 507.
37. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
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forcement of the agreement to arbitrate even as to the antitrust claims.
The Court of Appeals reversed the district court's holding insofar as it
had ordered submission of Soler's antitrust claims to arbitration.
The Supreme Court held that antitrust claims are arbitrable and em-
phasized the need for international comity, the flexibility of arbitration,
and the quality and legal training of potential arbitral tribunals world-
wide. The Court also stated that international arbitration provided an
adequate mechanism to police American democratic capitalism. Since
Mitsubishi, the Supreme Court has consistently held that mandatory law
claims (i.e., age discrimination, 38 and securities fraud 39) are arbitrable.
However, nonarbitrability is not yet extinct as a ground for challenge.
Indeed, in Mitsubishi, the Supreme Court stated that U.S. courts would
have a second chance at the enforcement stage to examine whether the
arbitral tribunal "took cognizance of the antitrust claims and actually de-
cided them."'40 Still, it is not clear whether Mitsubishi invites U.S. courts
to merely examine whether the arbitrators state that they considered the
antitrust issues, or whether Mitsubishi permits U.S. courts to review an
award on its merits. The latter would harm the arbitral process, espe-
cially if the parties had chosen non-U.S. law to govern their agreement.
3. An Arbitrator's Jurisdiction: Separability and Kompetenz-
Kompetenz 41
The arbitrator is not a judge. If he decides an issue not properly sub-
ject to his jurisdiction, the award may be vacated. In Prima Paint Corp. v.
Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.,42 holding that the defense of fraudulent in-
ducement of the underlying contract was for the arbitrator, and not the
court, to decide, the Supreme Court recognized the severability of an ar-
bitration provision from the rest of a contract as a matter of substantive
federal arbitration law under the FAA.43 Only if there is an allegation
that one of the parties committed fraud in inducing the other party to
enter into the arbitration clause itself could a court adjudicate the claim.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court held in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v.
Kaplan44 that a court could review de novo an arbitrator's ruling that a
non-signatory was bound to arbitrate. 45 Thereafter, the Court identified
an array of issues to be decided by the arbitrator rather than the court:
application of a time limit for submitting claims to arbitration;46 interpre-
tation of a limitation on the award of punitive damages;47 and determina-
38. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
39. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
40. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 638.
41. "Kompetenz-Kompetenz" refers to an arbitral tribunal's ability to rule on its own
jurisdiction.
42. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
43. Id. at 404.
44. First Options of Chicago, 514 U.S. 938.
45. Id. at 943.
46. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002).
47. PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401 (2003).
THE FINALITY QUESTION
tion of whether an arbitration agreement permits class wide arbitration.48
In Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna,49 the Supreme Court clar-
ified and expanded an arbitrator's jurisdiction. Buckeye operated a de-
ferred deposit service where its customer received cash in exchange for
writing a check for the amount received plus a financing charge. Buckeye
then agreed to hold onto the check until the customer's next payday or
until the arrival of a fixed income payment, such as social security. If the
customer were unable to pay the amount owed when due, the customer
could roll over his or her balance by paying fees that deferred payment
for another period.
A putative class action was brought in Florida state court on behalf of
Florida customers, who alleged that Buckeye's "pay day loans" violated
state lending and consumer protection statutes with exorbitant finance
charges and fees. Buckeye moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the
agreement its customers had signed. The trial court denied the motion,
holding that a court and not an arbitrator should decide whether the con-
tract was void. Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeals reversed. The
Florida Supreme Court reversed once more, stating it would not enforce
the arbitration agreement of a contract that was criminal in nature.
Reiterating Prima Paint, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the issue of
a contract's validity, even when challenged as void and illegal, is within
the arbitrator's jurisdiction. 50 Indeed, as a matter of substantive federal
arbitration law, an arbitration provision is severable from the remainder
of the contract. Therefore, a court will only examine an arbitration clause
in the context of an allegation of fraud in the inducement to enter into
the arbitration clause. 5'
The Court also expanded upon Prima Paint by holding that the federal
arbitration law created by the FAA applied in state courts.52 Accord-
ingly, an arbitration agreement's enforceability does not turn on a state's
public policy and contract law. 53 This is significant. A party can no more
rely upon a state law distinction between void and voidable contracts to
challenge arbitration.
4. Manifest Disregard for the Law
Manifest disregard for the law, first mentioned by the Supreme Court
in Wilko, is perhaps the most widely recognized and frequently argued
grounds for vacatur. The argument rarely prevails, however, as even
plainly wrong awards receive deference under the FAA. Indeed, mere
errors of law or mistakes of fact are not grounds for vacating an award.
Rather, to establish "manifest disregard" justifying vacatur, the arbitrator
48. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
49. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Wilko, 346 U.S. 427.
53. Buckeye Check Cashing, 546 U.S. 440.
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must have correctly stated and understood, but deliberately ignored, the
applicable law.54
One difficulty in presenting a successful "manifest disregard" argument
is that arbitrators are not required to explain the basis for their decisions.
Consequently, a reviewing court must assess "manifest disregard" by try-
ing to infer from the facts of the case whether a decision reflects that the
arbitrators appreciated the existence of a clearly governing legal principle
and, nevertheless, decided to ignore it.
Although courts have questioned the continuing validity of the "mani-
fest disregard" argument, it has succeeded in a handful of recent cases. In
Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., the Eleventh Circuit vacated an arbi-
tration panel's denial of an employee's claim for over-time pay brought
under the Fair Labor Standards Act. 55 The arbitration record reflected
that the employer's counsel flagrantly and repeatedly urged the arbitra-
tors to ignore the statute and that the panel took note of this plea in the
award.56 In DeGaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc.,57 the court modified an
arbitration decision after finding that an arbitration panel failed to award
attorney's fees to a plaintiff who had prevailed on a title VII discrimina-
tion claim. 58
5. Waiver of Review
Parties who wish to avoid the risks of review can exclude judicial re-
view under the FAA and thus enhance the finality of their award. A
contractual waiver of all judicial review of the arbitration proceedings, if
clear and unequivocal, is valid.59 Parties may also agree to expand the
grounds upon which an award is reviewed. 60
C. CONCLUSION
The selection of the United States as an arbitral site does not expand a
losing party's scope for challenging the award under the New York Con-
vention, since the grounds for vacating an award under the FAA are simi-
lar to those for refusing recognition of an award under the New York
Convention (except for the ground of manifest disregard for the law).
54. See Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 128 F. 3d. 1456 (11th Cir. 1997).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1461-62.
57. DeGaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
58. This case increased the scope of the "manifest disregard" exception since under
title VII an award of attorney's fees is discretionary, not mandatory. 42 U.S.C.S.
§ 1988 (2008).
59. Aerojet-General Corp. v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 478 F. 2d 248 (9th Cir.
1973).
60. In re Fils et Cables d'Acier de Lens, 584 F. Supp. 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). This is an
important point of distinction from civil law jurisdictions in Latin America and
especially Chile. Most Latin American jurisdictions would reject such a stipula-
tion. Indeed, as will be shown, amparo and the recurso de queja are nonwaivable
as they are designed to protect the vulnerable. However, they may in fact be used
to provide a highly technical escape route through which sophisticated parties can
avoid contractual obligations.
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Likewise, selecting Miami as the seat of arbitration does not expand the
scope of review of an arbitral award since the FAA preempts the FIAA.
Both the New York Convention and the FAA will deny enforcement of
an award that is contrary to public policy; both will reject an award not
capable of settlement by arbitration; and both will refuse enforcement of
an award beyond an arbitrator's jurisdiction.
II. MEXICO
A. MEXICAN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION LAW
Major Treaties: Mexico is a party to the New York Convention (entered
into force for Mexico on July 13, 1971),61 and the Panama Convention
(entered into force for Mexico on April 26, 1978).62 In addition, NAFTA
Chapter 1163 provides for arbitration to resolve disputes between inves-
tors and state parties. Mexico has also signed free trade agreements with
Bolivia, Costa Rica, Chile, Colombia, Venezuela, and the European
Union, among others.64 Finally, Mexico is party to Bilateral Investment
Treaties with Spain, Switzerland, Germany, Austria, the Belgium-Luxem-
bourg Union, the Netherlands, Denmark, France, Argentina, Italy, and
Sweden, which also provide for arbitration to resolve investor-state
61. See New York Convention, supra note 2. Mexico did not opt for either the reci-
procity or commercial reservations.
62. See Panama Convention, supra note 10. Mexican courts have decided three cases,
which indicate a possible willingness to fully enforce the New York and Panama
conventions. Presse Office S.A. v. Centro Editorial Hoy S.A. (decided in 18th
Civil Court, Fed. Dist., Feb. 24, 1977, summary reported in 4 Y.B. Com. Arb. 301
(1979)), and Maiden Mills, Inc. v. Hilaturas Lourdes S.A. (decided in 18th Civil
Court, Fed. Dist., Jan 29, 1977, summary reported in 4 Y.B. Com. Arb. 302 (1979))
are cases where defendant Mexican companies had participated willingly in over-
seas arbitrations but later objected to enforcement of the awards for lack of notifi-
cation en persona as mandated by the Mexican Constitution. In each case the
courts held that by agreeing to arbitration under institutional rules (ICC and AAA
rules respectively), the defendants had waived the formalities that Mexican proce-
dural legislation otherwise required. In Mitsui de Mexico S.A. v. Alkon Textil S.A.
(decided in the Higher Court of Appeals, 4th Chamber, Oct. 21, 1986, summary
reported in 16 Y.B. Com. Arb. 594 (1991)), the parties' contracts contained an
arbitration clause, which provided for arbitration in Japan, under Japanese law and
according to the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association's rules of procedure.
Alkon initiated court proceedings against Mitsui in Mexico seeking restitution and
damages. In response, Mitsui invoked the arbitration clause, but the Judge of First
Instance refused to refer the dispute to arbitration. The Court of Appeals held
that since there was no dispute as to the authenticity of the agreement to arbitrate,
the parties' expressed intentions should be enforced [hereinafter Mexican
Jurisprudence].
63. See NAFTA Chapter 11, supra note 12. NAFTA Chapter 11 disputes may only be
submitted to arbitration under the ICSID Convention where the government and
investors are both from member countries. Since Mexico is not yet an ICSID
member, only the ICSID Additional Facility Rules or the UNCITRAL Rules are
available for disputes between Mexico and the U.S. Only UNCITRAL Rules are
available for disputes between Mexico and Canada since neither is an ICSID mem-
ber (Canada has signed but not ratified the Convention). Id. art. 1120.
64. Claus von Wobeser, Mexico, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN LATIN AMERICA,
in KLUWER LAW INTERNAT'L 157 (Nigel Blackaby et al. eds. 2002).
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disputes. 65
National Legislation: Mexico is a federal republic. The Commercial
Code governs commercial matters, including commercial litigation and
arbitration,66 and applies in the thirty-one states and the Federal Dis-
trict.67 The Commercial Code was amended in 1989 to incorporate a new
title on arbitration, which was replaced with a wholly new arbitration
chapter in 1993. The 1993 reforms incorporated the UNCITRAL Model
Law on International Commercial Arbitration with minor
modifications.68
Article 1457 of the Commercial Code provides a limited list of grounds
that justify a court's setting aside of an award on the merits identical to
those contained not only in the UNCITRAL Model Law, but also in arti-
cle V of the New York Convention. Grounds for setting aside an award
are the following:
a. Incapacity of the parties to conclude the arbitration agreement or
lack of a valid arbitration agreement;
b. Lack of notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbi-
tral proceedings or inability of a party to present his case;
c. The award deals with matters not covered by the submission to
arbitration;
d. The composition of the arbitral tribunal or the conduct of arbitral
proceedings is contrary to the effective agreement of the parties or,
failing such agreement, to the Commercial Code;
e. Nonarbitrability of the subject-matter of the dispute; and
f. Violation of Mexican public policy.
Public policy exceptions may include a dispute involving public law
or a state-owned company, discovery, and common law tort claims.
Additionally, a court may refuse to enforce an arbitral award ren-
dered in a country that does not recognize foreign arbitral awards. 69
Procedurally, the action for setting aside an award must be commenced
within three months of the notification of the award.70 No special form is
required. The parties, moreover, may not waive, before or after a dispute
has arisen, the action for setting aside.
An application for setting aside is the only recourse against an arbitral
65. Id.
66. Codigo de Comercio (Commercial Code) [hereinafter Cod Com].
67. Constitucion Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [Const.], as amended,
Diario Oficial de la Federacion [D.O.], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.), at art. 73(X)
[hereinafter Mex. Const.].
68. In addition to its 1976 Model Arbitration Rules, UNCITRAL has also promul-
gated a 1985 Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration. Under the
Model Law, submission to arbitration may be ad hoc for a particular dispute, but is
accomplished most often in advance of the dispute by a general submission clause
within a contract. United Nations Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law, Status of Conven-
tions and Model Laws, 13, 24 I.L.M. 1302 (1985) available at http//www.uncitral.
org/en-index.htm.
69. See Cod Com, supra note 66, arts. 1457-1460.
70. Id. art. 1457.
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award rendered in Mexico, and the court's decision is final. 71 However, it
is necessary to address the amparo (protective) proceeding provided for
by Mexican law.
B. CURRENT ISSUES IN MEXICAN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION LAW
1. Amparo
Amparo is an autonomous legal proceeding before a federal court that
guarantees the protection of an individual's constitutional rights against
public authorities. Amparo is not enforceable against private citizens. 72
A party may not invoke amparo to vacate an arbitral award because an
arbitrator is not a public authority and the award is not an act of author-
ity.73 Amparo, however, can be invoked to challenge the resolution of a
judge in an action for setting aside an award, since the ruling is an act by a
public authority.74
The party who initiates an amparo proceeding in commercial matters
generally asserts two specific protective functions: the constitutionality of
laws (amparo contra leyes) and the challenge of judicial decisions (judicial
amparo). The amparo contra leyes may be achieved either in an adver-
sarial proceeding with a state official as the opposing party to the com-
plainant, or via a recourse challenge. In an adversarial proceeding,
amparo is first brought in federal district court. 75 Once the district court
enters an amparo judgment, a review can be filed in circuit court. The
circuit court will then issue a judgment on the review, which is final and
unchallengeable.76
A recourse challenge, conversely, does not directly challenge the con-
stitutionality of the law. Rather, the complainant requests that the re-
viewing court determine whether the lower court's decision was based on
unconstitutional law. If the reviewing court determines that the lower
court's ruling was based on unconstitutional law, the result is a violation
of the federal supremacy clause. 77 The appeal can either be initiated in
circuit court or the Supreme Court, with the understanding that the Su-
preme Court may ultimately review the circuit court's decision. 78 All or-
dinary remedies or appeals must be exhausted before amparo may be
used.79
The judicial amparo constitutes more than 80 percent of amparo pro-
71. Id. art. 1458.
72. See Mex. Const., supra note 67, art. 103(1).
73. Amparo Civil Directo, Interpuesto Ante La Suprema Corte, 2 S.J.F.5a 1131
(1918); Amparo Civil. Interppuesto Ante La Suprema Corte, 3 S.J.F.5a 879 (1918);
Amparo Civil, Directo, 6 S.J.F.5a 922 (1920); Amparo Civil En Revision 26
S.J.F.5a 236 (1930).
74. Carlos Loperena Ruiz, The Process of Amparo in Commercial Matters, 6 U.S.-
MEX. L.J. 43 (1998).
75. See Mex. Const., supra note 67, art. 107(VII).
76. Ruiz, supra note 74.
77. See Mex. Const., supra note 67, art. 133.
78. Id. art. 107(IX).
79. Id. art. 107(111).
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ceedings. It is codified in article 14 of the Mexican Constitution 8 and
may be asserted against judicial and quasi-judicial judgments. A claimant
initiating the judicial amparo can assert both procedural errors (error en
procedando) and substantive errors (error en judicando). Procedural er-
rors are challengeable only if they affect the court's final decision. 81 Ad-
ditionally, the appellate court cannot perform de novo review. 82
2. Claims Capable of Settlement by Arbitration
Mexican law operates an exclusionary list of matters that are not arbi-
trable. Namely, criminal liability, certain agricultural matters, most fam-
ily matters, tax matters, and employment matters. Additionally, article
568 of the Mexico Federal Code of Civil Procedure establishes the exclu-
sive competence of the national courts to hear any dispute regarding the
following matters:
a. Land and water located in the national territory, including the sub-
soil, airspace, territorial sea and continental platform, whether it is a
matter of real property rights, rights derived from concessions for
use, exploration, exploitation development, or the leasing of such
property;
b. Resources of the exclusive economic zone of the sea or those that
are related to any of the sovereign rights over such zone, in the terms
of the Federal Law of the Sea;
c. Acts of authority or those pertaining to the internal regime of the
State and of the agencies of the Federation and of the Federal
entities;
d. International regime of the embassies and consulates of Mexico
abroad and their official actions; and
e. Those cases specifically provided for in other laws.83
Article 615 of the Mexico Code of Civil Procedure of the Federal Dis-
trict establishes that the following matters cannot be submitted to
arbitration:
a. The right to receive maintenance;
b. Divorce, except for the separation of property and merely pecuni-
ary differences if they can be settled;
c. Claims of matrimonial nullity;
d. Claims concerning the civil status of persons; and
e. Other matters expressly prohibited by law.84
It is worth noting that when public entities contract commercially they
may agree that disputes be resolved by private arbitration, both domestic
and international. In fact, there is no prohibition of arbitration based on
the identity of the parties to the contract. 85
80. Id. art. 14.
81. Ley de Amparo, art. 158 (Mex.).
82. See Mex. Const., supra note 67, art. 107(IX).
83. Codigo Federal de Procedimientos Civiles, art. 568 (Mex.).
84. Codigo Civil Federal, art. 615 (Mex.).
85. Wobeser, supra note 64, at 162.
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Finally, the Mexican legislature recently began to extend the subject
matter scope of arbitration by including, for example, industrial property
law, copyright law, and telecommunications law. As a general rule, those
conflicts that cover matters of private law are arbitrable, while those that
involve public rights (unwaivable rights) are not.86
3. An Arbitrator's Jurisdiction: Separability and Kompetenz-Kompetenz
An arbitral tribunal can rule on its own jurisdiction. 8 7 Its decision on
jurisdiction, however, is subject to review. Indeed, any party may re-
quest, within thirty days of an arbitrator's ruling, a judge to decide the
matter. The reviewing judge's decision is final.88
C. CONCLUSION
Mexico's internal adoption of the Model Law as the legislative stan-
dard for both international and domestic commercial arbitration is a sig-
nificant step forward toward harmonization of the Mexican legal
framework with the New York Convention. Amparo, however, may seri-
ously inhibit the recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award and
undermine the benefits that international arbitration provides. Although
Mexican jurisprudencia has recognized that the New York and Panama
Conventions' provisions may supersede those of Mexican law,89 the
courts have stressed that the Mexican defendants in those cases had
waived the procedural requirements of Mexican law. Therefore, it re-
mains possible that the protections of amparo could apply in those cases
where procedural requirements have not been waived.
Finally, the Mexican courts sometimes render contradictory judgments.
A ruling can only become binding law if the Supreme Court rules the
same way in five consecutive decisions,90 and even if it becomes binding,
the decision will not retroactively effect the contradictory judgments. 91
Simply put, once a court has rendered its decision, the decision is final
and unchallengeable, even though the Supreme Court may resolve con-
tradictory judgments. 92 This threatens Mexico's predictability as a forum.
III. CHILE
A. CHILEAN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION LAW
Major Treaties: Chile is a party to the New York Convention (entered
into force for Chile on December 3, 1975), 93 and the Panama Convention
86. Id.
87. See Cod Com, supra note 66, art. 1432.
88. Wobeser, supra note 64, at 169.
89. See Mexican Jurisprudence, supra note 62.
90. Ley de Amparo, art. 192 (Mex.).
91. See Mex. Const., supra note 67, art. 107(XIII).
92. Id.
93. See New York Convention, supra note 2. Chile did not opt for either the reciproc-
ity or commercial reservations.
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(entered into force for Chile on June 16, 1976). 9 4 Chile also is a party to
the ICSID Convention.95 ICSID is designed to serve as a forum for con-
ciliation and for arbitration of disputes between private investors and
host governments. In addition, chapter 10 of the US-Chile FTA 96 pro-
vides for arbitration to resolve disputes between investors and state par-
ties. Chile has also signed free trade agreements with Canada, China, and
Mexico and is an associate member of Mercosur. 97 Finally, Chile is party
to over forty bilateral investment treaties, which also provide for arbitra-
tion to resolve investor-state disputes. 98
National Legislation: On September 29, 2004, Chile enacted Law No.
19971 on International Commercial Arbitration.99 The Chilean Arbitra-
tion Act (CAA) is an exact replica of the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law
on International Commercial Arbitration. The adoption of the Model
Law complements Chile's prior ratification of the New York, Panama,
and ICSID Conventions and provides a modern international arbitration
framework.
Consistent with Model Law principles, the CAA allows for an applica-
tion to set aside as the only available challenge against an international
arbitral award rendered in Chile.100 Indeed, article 34(2) of the CAA
vests in "the competent Court of Appeals" the exclusive authority to set
aside an international arbitral award rendered in Chile. 101 Therefore, an
international arbitration conducted in Chile should theoretically reach a
definitive, conclusive end with a decision by a Court of Appeals either
confirming or setting aside the international arbitral awards. In addition,
article 5 of the CAA states, "In matters governed by this Law, no court
shall intervene except where so provided in this Law," apparently fore-
closing a broad court review of arbitral awards. 10 2
B. CURRENT ISSUES IN CHILEAN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION LAW
1. Recurso de Queja
Upon close examination, parties may have a right under the Chilean
Constitution and the Organic Code of the Judiciary to bring a challenge
directly to the Supreme Court. Such right may even be nonwaivable. In-
deed, the legislative history of the CAA shows that during discussions in
the Chamber of Deputies, article 5 was deleted at the request of Chile's
94. See Panama Convention, supra note 10.
95. See ICSID Convention, supra note 11.
96. See Chile FTA, supra note 13, at chapter 10. See also DIRECON, http://www.
direcon.cl (last visited Aug. 12, 2006).
97. Wobeser, supra note 64.
98. Id.
99. Law 19971 on International Commercial Arbitration, Diario Oficial 29-IX-2004
(Chile).
100. Id. art. 34(1).
101. Id., art. 34(2).
102. Id.
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Supreme Court. 10 3 The Supreme Court argued that article 5 implicitly
limited its intervention in the international commercial arbitration con-
text strictly to entertaining applications for the recognition and enforce-
ment of foreign arbitral awards, thereby precluding it from exercising due
control or supervision over all Chilean courts in all matters it deems ap-
propriate, as mandated by the 1980 Constitution. 10 4 Ultimately, the Sen-
ate reinstated the original version of article 5 into the CAA with the
explicit understanding that the Constitution preempts the CAA. Specifi-
cally, although article 5 is important in the context of international com-
mercial arbitration, it does not have any restricting legal effect over the
powers vested in the Supreme Court by virtue of the Constitution, the
supreme law of Chile. 0 5
The procedural mechanism that typically triggers the Supreme Court's
exercise of its supervisory powers over all Chilean courts, including arbi-
tral tribunals, is the recurso de queja. The recurso de queja is a means
whereby parties to a dispute can petition a higher court to correct errors
or grave abuses committed in the issuance of judgments. 10 6 Pursuant to
article 545 of the Organic Code of the Judiciary, the recurso de queja is
only available when the error or abuse is committed in interlocutory judg-
ments that 1) put an end to the trial or make impossible its continuation
or finalization (including decisions by a Court of Appeals either confirm-
ing or vacating an international arbitral award rendered in Chile) and 2)
are not subject to any kind of challenge, ordinary or extraordinary, except
for final judgments issued by arbitrators in courts of first instance, in
which case the recurso de queja is available, in addition to the recurso de
casaci6n en la forma.10 7 Hence, despite the explicit wording of articles 5
and 34(1) of the CAA, a Court of Appeals' decision is likely to be subject
to a recurso de queja before the Supreme Court with the losing party
claiming a serious error or abuse in judgment.
Consequently, the recurso de queja arguably grants the Chilean Su-
preme Court substantial discretion to vacate an international arbitral
award rendered in Chile, beyond the grounds specified under the CAA
and the New York Convention. Indeed, Chilean case law on the applica-
tion of the recurso de queja against domestic arbitral awards reveals that
the Supreme Court has vacated arbitral awards not only on grounds of
extreme, mainly procedural errors or abuses, but has also set them aside
103. Gonzalo Biggs, Breakthrough for International Commercial Arbitration in Chile,
Disp. RESOL. J., Feb./Apr. 2004 at 66.
104. David M. Lindsey and Ricardo Rieso, The 2004 Chilean Arbitration Act on Inter-
national Commercial Arbitration, Selecting Chile as Seat of Arbitration: A Real Op-
tion?, 739 PLI/Lit 635 (2006). Article 82 of the 1980 Constitution provides that
"[t]he Supreme Court is vested with directional, correctional and economic super-
visory powers over all Chilean courts."
105. Id.
106. The recurso de queja differs from amparo in that it is a challenge to the arbitrators,
as opposed to a challenge to the resolution of a judge in an action for setting aside
an award.
107. Julio Guzmdn JordAn, Arbitraje y Recurso de Queja, Centro de Arbitraje y Media-
cion de la Camara de Comercio de Santiago.
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when the arbitrator or arbitral tribunal did not appropriately ponder the
evidence rendered or misapplied the law (the Supreme Court may well
apply the same standard in the case of international arbitration awards
rendered in Chile). For example, the Supreme Court in In re Velasco
Guzman, Roberto,10 8 modified, as against Chilean contract law, the arbi-
trator's determination of the interest the defendant owed to the plaintiff
in a breach of contract action. In Banco de Chile con Juez Arbitro,10 9 the
Supreme Court vacated, as against Chilean real estate law, an order is-
sued by the arbitrator denying a local court its authorization to seize real
estate over which the arbitrator had previously issued an interim measure
of protection to avoid its sale. Finally, in In re Guillon Cuevas, Pedro y
Otra," 10 the Supreme Court vacated, as contrary to the evidence rendered
by the parties during the arbitration proceeding, the valuation of a piece
of land made by the arbitrator for purposes of determining the compensa-
tion owed to the plaintiff.
2. Claims Capable of Settlement by Arbitration
Under Chilean law, the freedom of parties to choose arbitration as a
method of dispute resolution is subject to two exceptions: non-arbitrable
matters and compulsory arbitration. Matters that are not arbitrable in-
clude cases involving rights of maintenance, the right to request the sepa-
ration of assets between husband and wife, criminal matters and issues
between a legal representative and the person for whom he acts, as well
as cases in which the Public Prosecutor must be heard." 1 Matters regard-
ing the legal status of individuals, employment disputes, and other similar
matters also are not arbitrable.
The following disputes must be referred to arbitration:
a. The division of common property between husband and wife or of
a limited company or jointly held property generally;
b. The division of assets;
c. Questions concerning the presentation of management accounts or
liquidator's accounts of commercial companies and other accounting
disputes;
d. Disputes between shareholders of a public limited company, or of
a limited company, or a partner;
e. Disputes between shareholders of a limited company; and
f. Disputes regarding water rights.' 1 2
3. An Arbitrator's Jurisdiction: Separability and Kompetenz-Kompetenz
Chilean law does not expressly regulate an arbitrator's jurisdiction.
Still, jurisdiction is limited in terms of the parties, the subject matter, the
108. Reported in the Revista Chilena de Derecho y Jurisprudencia, Tomo LXXX, No. 3.
109. Reported in El Arbitraje en la Jurisprudencia, Centro de Arbitraje y Mediacion de
la Camara de Comercio de Santiago (2005), at 292.
110. Reported in the Revista Chilena de Derecho y Jurisprudencia, Tomo XCVI, No. 2.
111. Organic Code of the Judiciary, arts. 229-230 (Chile).
112. Id. art. 227. See also Cod Corn, supra note 66, art. 415.
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powers of the arbitral tribunal itself, and the time during which their ju-
risdiction must be exercised. Individuals cannot be forced to submit to
arbitration unless it is mandatory. Therefore, only a clear statement to
agree to arbitration by means of a submission agreement or an arbitration
clause can give jurisdiction to an arbitrator.
An arbitrator's jurisdiction is restricted to matters that relate to the
agreement or legal relationship from which their appointment arose. In
addition, as explained supra, there are certain non-arbitrable matters that
cannot be decided in arbitration.1 13
C. CONCLUSION
Despite Chile's adoption of the Model Law for international arbitra-
tion, there remains an important question regarding the scope of review
by Chilean courts of arbitral awards rendered in Chile. Indeed, an inter-
national arbitral award rendered in Chile may be subject not only to an
application before a Court of Appeals to set it aside but also to the
recurso de queja challenge before the Supreme Court. This might se-
verely undermine Chile's reputation and credibility as a reliable interna-
tional arbitration center. Some practitioners have proposed an
amendment to article 34(2) of the CAA that would directly vest the Su-
preme Court with jurisdiction to hear applications to set aside interna-
tional arbitral awards rendered in Chile. 114 This would create greater
uniformity in the application and interpretation of the CAA. Currently
the seventeen Courts of Appeals in Chile have jurisdiction to hear appli-
cations to set aside such awards, resulting in contradictory case law in
regard to what constitutes Chilean public policy, the requisite minimum
procedural requirements for an arbitration proceeding, subject matter
arbitrability, and the interpretation of the Kompetenz-Kompetenz
principle.
Proponents of the amendment, however, acknowledge that even with
this proposed change the Supreme Court might decide to review the fac-
tual and legal merits of international arbitral awards rendered in Chile.
Nevertheless, vesting the Supreme Court with exclusive jurisdiction to set
aside arbitral awards pursuant to the CAA might reinforce the argument
that the court should limit its review to those grounds found in article
34(2) of the CAA. 115
IV. CONCLUSION
Rights of appeal and review in a jurisdiction can seriously frustrate the
advantages of international arbitration-predictability and neutrality as a
forum, the potential for specialized legal expertise, the costs of the arbi-
tral process, the finality of the arbitral award, and the speed by which the
113. Id. art. 234. Rules that apply to the subject matters that may be heard at arbitra-
tion are listed in Art. 111.
114. See Lindsey, supra note 104.
115. Id.
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award can be enforced abroad-over the vicissitudes and uncertainties of
international business litigation.116 After surveying the various jurisdic-
tions discussed, the United States appears to more fully circumscribe the
right to challenge an international arbitral award when compared to Mex-
ico and Chile. Indeed, parties who wish to avoid the risks of review can
exclude judicial review under the FAA and thus enhance the finality of
their award, whereas amparo and the recurso de queja are nonwaivable.
This is not to say that Mexico and Chile have not significantly im-
proved and modernized international arbitration law in their countries.
Nor do limits on judicial review necessarily qualify one jurisdiction as
better than another. Yet the disadvantage of additional cost and delay in
a jurisdiction that has a greater scope for judicial review is outweighed by
the restraint on arbitrary decision making that expanded review im-
poses.117 Most international investors would not want to bring the first
post-legal change case to see whether local courts comply. Accordingly, a
jurisdiction that grants parties the right to decide in advance the desired
scope of judicial review is preferable." 18
Nevertheless, it is not always possible to limit the scope of judicial re-
view. Where only a brief arbitration clause is possible, the selection of the
arbitral seat is critical. Indeed, if the right of review is not carefully con-
sidered in connection with the designation of the arbitral seat, the origi-
nal purpose of agreeing to arbitration can be significantly undermined.
116. Folsom, supra note 3, at 732.
117. Kolkey, supra note 1, at 714.
118. Id.
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